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Abstract
Large-scale clinical data is invaluable to driv-
ing many computational scientific advances
today. However, understandable concerns re-
garding patient privacy hinder the open dis-
semination of such data and give rise to subop-
timal siloed research. De-identification meth-
ods attempt to address these concerns but were
shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks.
In this work, we focus on the vast amounts
of unstructured natural language data stored
in clinical notes and propose to automatically
generate synthetic clinical notes that are more
amenable to sharing using generative models
trained on real de-identified records. To eval-
uate the merit of such notes, we measure both
their privacy preservation properties as well as
utility in training clinical NLP models. Ex-
periments using neural language models yield
notes whose utility is close to that of the real
ones in some clinical NLP tasks, yet leave am-
ple room for future improvements.
1 Introduction
Clinical data and clinical notes specifically, are an
important factor for the advancement of computa-
tional methods in the medical domain. Suffice to
say that the recently introduced MIMIC-III clin-
ical database alone (Johnson et al., 2016) already
has hundreds of cites on Google Scholar. How-
ever, understandable privacy concerns yield strict
restrictions on clinical data dissemination, thus in-
hibiting scientific progress. De-identification tech-
niques provide some relief (Dernoncourt et al.,
2017), but are still far from providing the privacy
guarantees required for unrestricted sharing (Ohm,
2009; Shokri et al., 2017).
In this work, we investigate the possibility of
disseminating clinical notes data by computation-
ally generating synthetic notes that are safer to
share than real ones. To this end, we introduce
a clinical notes generation task, where synthetic
notes are to be generated based on a set of real
de-identified clinical discharge summary notes,
henceforth referred to as MedText, which we ex-
tracted from MIMIC-III. The evaluation includes
a new measure of the privacy preservation proper-
ties of the synthetic notes, as well as their utility on
three clinical NLP tasks. We use neural language
models to perform this task and discuss the po-
tential and challenges of this approach. Resources
associated with this paper are available for down-
load. 1
2 Background
2.1 Clinical Notes
Electronic health records contain a wealth of in-
formation about patients in the form of both struc-
tured data and unstructured text. While struc-
tured data is critical for purposes like billing and
administration, unstructured clinical notes con-
tain important information entered by doctors,
nurses, and other staff associated with patient
care, which is not captured elsewhere. To this
end, researchers have found that although struc-
tured data is easily accessible, clinical notes re-
main indispensable for understanding a patient
record (Birman-Deych et al., 2005; Singh et al.,
2004). Rosenbloom et al. (2011) argued that clini-
cal notes are considered to be more useful for iden-
tifying patients with specific disorders. A study
by Ko¨pcke et al. (2013) found that 65% of the
data required to determine eligibility of a patient
into clinical trials was not found in structured data
and required examination of clinical notes. Simi-
lar findings were also reported by Raghavan et al.
(2014).
Due to their importance, it is no wonder that
clinical notes are used extensively in medical NLP
1https://github.com/orenmel/synth-clinical-notes
research. Unfortunately, however, due to privacy
concerns, explained further below, it is very com-
mon that the data is exclusively available only to
researchers collaborating with or working for a
particular healthcare provider (Choi et al., 2016;
Afzal et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018).
2.2 De-identification
Clinical notes contain sensitive personal informa-
tion required for medical investigations, which
is protected by law. For example, in the
United States, the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA)2 defines
18 types of protected health information (PHI)
that needs to be removed to de-identify clini-
cal notes (e.g. name, age, dates and contact
details). Both manual and automated methods
for de-identification have been investigated with
varying degrees of success. Neamatullah et al.
(2008) reported a recall ranging from 0.63 to 0.94
between 14 clinicians for manually identifying
PHI in 130 clinical notes. Since human annota-
tions for clinical data are costly (Douglass et al.,
2004), researchers have investigated automated
and semi-automated methods for de-identification
(Gobbel et al., 2014; Hanauer et al., 2013). Au-
tomated methods range from rule-based systems
(Morrison et al., 2009) to statistical methods such
as support vector machines and conditional ran-
dom fields (Stubbs et al., 2015), with more recent
use of recurrent neural networks (Liu et al., 2017;
Dernoncourt et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, despite strong results reported
for clinical data de-identification methods, it is
usually hard to determine to what extent they
are resistant to re-identification attacks on health-
care data (Ohm, 2009; El Emam et al., 2011;
Gkoulalas-Divanis et al., 2014). Therefore, in
practice, de-identified patient data is almost never
shared freely, and complementary privacy protec-
tion techniques, such as the one described in the
following section, are being actively investigated.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Collections of private individual data records are
commonly used to compute aggregated statisti-
cal information or train statistical models that are
made publicly available. Possible use cases in-
clude collections of search queries used to pro-
2Office for Civil Rights H. Standards for privacy of indi-
vidually identifiable health information. Final rule. Federal
Register. 2002;67:53181.
vide intelligent auto-completion suggestions to
users of search engines and medical records used
to train computer-based clinical expert systems.
While this is not always transparent, providing ac-
cess to such aggregated information may be suf-
ficient for attackers to infer some individual pri-
vate data. One example to such well crafted at-
tacks are the membership inference attacks pro-
posed by Shokri et al. (2017). In these attacks, the
adversary has only black-box access to a machine
learning model that was trained on a collection of
records, and tries to learn how to infer whether any
given data record was part of that model’s train set
or not. Susceptibility to such attacks is an indica-
tion that private information may be compromised.
Differential privacy (DP) is, broadly speaking,
a guarantee that the personal information of each
individual record within a collection is reasonably
protected even when the aggregated statistical in-
formation is exposed. A model that is trained on
some record collection as its input and makes its
outputs publicly available, will provide stronger
DP guarantees the less those outputs depend on the
presence of any individual record in the collection.
More formally, a randomized function K pro-
vides ǫ−differential privacy if for all collections
C1 and C2 differing by at most one element, and
all S ⊆ Range(K):
log p(K(C1) ∈ S)− log p(K(C2) ∈ S) ≤ ǫ
A mechanism K satisfying this definition ad-
dresses concerns of personal information leakage
from any individual record since the inclusion of
that record will not result in any publicly exposed
outputs becoming significantly more or less likely
(Dwork, 2008).
Differential privacy is an active research field,
with various techniques proposed to provide DP
guarantees to various machine learning models
(Abadi et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2018). How-
ever, while DP shares some motivation with tra-
ditional machine learning techniques, such as the
need to avoid overfitting, it is unfortunately not
always easy to achieve good differential privacy
guarantees, and they typically come at the cost
of some accuracy degradation and computational
complexity.
2.4 Language Modeling
Language models (LMs) learn to estimate the
probability of a next word given a context of pre-
ceding words, i.e. Pˆ (wi|w1..i−1), where wi is
the word in position i in the text. They were
found useful in many NLP tasks, including text
classification (Howard and Ruder, 2018), machine
translation (Luong et al., 2015) and speech recog-
nition (Chen et al., 2015). They are also com-
monly used for generating text (Sutskever et al.,
2011; Radford et al., 2018) as we do in this pa-
per. To generate text, a trained model is typically
used to estimate the conditional probability dis-
tribution of the next word Pˆ (wi|w1..i−1). Next,
it samples a word for position i from this distri-
bution and then goes on to sample the next one
based on Pˆ (wi+1|w1..i) and so on. The predomi-
nant model design used to implement LMs today
used to be Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
due to their ability to capture long distance
contexts (Jozefowicz et al., 2016), but recently,
the attention-based Transformer architecture sur-
passed state of the art results (Radford et al., 2018;
Dai et al., 2019).
3 The Clinical Notes Generation Task
To establish the merit of synthetic clinical notes
generated by statistical models, we propose a task
setup that consists of: (1) real de-identified clin-
ical notes datasets used to train models, which in
turn generate synthetic notes; (2) privacy measures
used to estimate the privacy preservation proper-
ties of the synthetic notes; and (3) utility bench-
marks used to estimate the usefulness of the notes.
To be considered successful, a model needs to
score well both on privacy and utility measures.
3.1 Original Clinical Notes Data
As our source for composing the real clini-
cal notes datasets, we used MIMIC-III (v1.4)
(Johnson et al., 2016), a large de-identified
database that comprises nearly 60,000 hospital
admissions for 38,645 adult patients. Despite hav-
ing been stripped of patient identifiers, MIMIC’s
records are available to researchers only under
strict terms of use that include careful access
restrictions and completion of sensitive data
training3 due to privacy concerns.
Training language models is expensive in terms
of time and compute power. It is a common
practice (Merity et al., 2017) to evaluate language
models that were trained on both a small dataset
3https://mimic.physionet.org/gettingstarted/access/
that is relatively quick to train on and a medium-
sized dataset which can demonstrate some benefits
of scale while still being manageable. Therefore,
within MIMIC-III, following Dernoncourt et al.
(2017), we focused on the discharge summary
notes due to their content diversity and richness
in natural language text. Further, we followed
the recently introduced WikiText-2 and WikiText-
103 datasets (Merity et al., 2017) to determine
plausible size, splits and most of the preprocess-
ing of our datasets. These datasets include text
fromWikipedia articles and are commonly used to
benchmark general-domain language models. We
name our respective benchmarks, MedText-2 and
MedText-103.
To create the MedText datasets, we first ex-
tracted the full text of the discharge summary
notes from the NOTEEVENTS table available
from MIMIC-III. Since the text includes arbi-
trary line splits, presumably for formatting rea-
sons, we merged lines and then performed sen-
tence splitting and word tokenization using the
NLP toolkit spaCy.4 We then randomly sam-
pled notes to create the MedText-2 and MedText-
103 datasets. Each of these datasets was split
into train/validation/test subsets, with MedText-
2 and MedText-103 comprising approximately 2
and 103 million word train sets, respectively, and
sharing the same ∼200K-word validation and test
sets. Finally, we replaced all words with an occur-
rence count below 3 with an unk token.5
Table 1 describes more precise statistics of the
resulting MedText datasets, compared to the re-
spective WikiText datasets. As seen, compared to
the WikiText datasets, which are nearly identical
in terms of word counts, we note that MedText ex-
hibits notably smaller vocabulary sizes (24K vs.
33K and 135K vs. 267K) and Out-Of-Vocabulary
(OOV) rates (1.5% vs. 2.6% and 0.3% vs. 0.4%).
We hypothesize that this is one of the artifacts of
MedText being more domain-specific than Wiki-
Text, as it is restricted only to discharge summary
notes. To this end, we note that to the best of
our knowledge, unlike the general domain where
popular language modeling benchmarks, such as
WikiText, PTB and WMT (Chelba et al., 2014),
are commonly used, there are no equivalent bench-
marks specific to the medical domain. Therefore,
4https://spacy.io/
5This was done separately for MedText-2 and MedText-
103 resulting in a discrepancy between their validation/test
sets in terms of the unk tokens.
Train Valid Test
MedText-2
Notes 1280 128 128
Words 2,259,966 228,795 219,650
Vocab 24,052
OOV 1.5%
MedText-103
Notes 59,396 128 128
Words 103,590,422 228,795 219,650
Vocab 135,220
OOV 0.3%
Train Valid Test
WikiText-2
Articles 600 60 60
Words 2,088,628 217,646 245,569
Vocab 33,278
OOV 2.6%
WikiText-103
Articles 28,475 60 60
Words 103,227,021 217,646 245,569
Vocab 267,735
OOV 0.4%
Table 1: MedText vs. WikiText dataset statistics
as an independent contribution, we propose Med-
Text as such a benchmark.
3.2 The Privacy Measure
As mentioned in the Background section, while
traditional de-identification methods, such as
deleting patient identifiers, are an essential pre-
requisite to protecting the privacy of patient data,
it is well understood that they are not sufficient
to provide strong privacy guarantees. To address
this, we propose to share the output of statisti-
cal models that were trained to generate synthetic
data based on real de-identified data. While this
intuitively seems to increase privacy preservation
compared to sharing the real data, it is still not
necessarily sufficient, due to potential private in-
formation leakage from such models.
To quantify the risk involved in sharing syn-
thetic clinical notes, we propose to use an empir-
ical measure of private information leakage. This
measure is meant to serve two purposes: (1) help
drive the development of synthetic clinical notes
generation methods that preserve privacy; and (2)
inform decision makers regarding the concrete risk
in releasing any given synthetic notes dataset.
Our proposed measure is adopted from the field
of Differential Privacy (DP). Recently, Long et al.
(2017) proposed an empirical differential pri-
vacy measure, called Differential Training Pri-
vacy (DTP). Unlike DP guarantees, which are ana-
lyzed theoretically and apply only to specific mod-
els designed for DP, DTP is a local property of any
model and a concrete training set. It can be derived
by means of empirical computation to any trained
model regardless of whether it has theoretical DP
guarantees, and provides an estimate of the pri-
vacy risks associated with sharing the outputs of
that concrete trained model. In this work, we base
our privacy measures on the Pointwise Differen-
tial Training Privacy (PDTP) metric (Long et al.,
2017), a more computationally efficient variant of
DTP:
(1)PDTPM,T (t) =
max
y∈Y
(|log pM(T )(y|t)− log pM(T\{t})(y|t)|)
for a classification modelM , a set of possible class
predictions Y , a training set T , and a specific tar-
get record t ∈ T for which the risk is measured.
The rationale for this measure is that to protect the
privacy of t, the difference in the predictions of
a model trained with t versus those of a model
trained without it, should be as small as possi-
ble, and in particular when it comes to predictions
made when the model is applied to t itself.
For the purpose of measuring privacy, we make
the assumption that the modelM that was trained
to generate the synthetic notes can be queried for
the conditional probability log pM(T )(w
c
i |w
c
1..i−1),
where wci is the i-th word in clinical note c, which
is our equivalent of a record. 6 We note that unlike
in the setting of Long et al. (2017), where a single
class y is predicted for each record, for synthetic
notes, we can view every generated word wci in
c as a separate class prediction. Accordingly, we
propose Sequential-PDTP:
(2)
S − PDTPM,T (c)
= max
i∈1..|c|
(
|log pM(T )(w
c
i |w
c
1..i−1)
− log pM(T\{c})(w
c
i |w
c
1..i−1)|
)
6If M does not disclose this information, then the syn-
thetic notes it generates could be used to train a language
model M ′ that does, as an approximation for M .
S-PDTP estimates the privacy risk for clinical
note c as the largest absolute difference between
the conditional probability predictions made by
M(T ) and M(T \ {c}) for any of the words in
c given their preceding context. Finally, our pro-
posed privacy score for notes generated by a model
M trained on a benchmark dataset T , is the ex-
pected privacy risk, where a higher score indicates
a higher expected risk:
(3)S−PDTPM,T = Ec∈T [S−PDTPM,T (c)]
Intuitively, a high S-PDTP score means that
the output of the trained model is sensitive to the
presence of at least some individual records in
its training set and therefore revealing that output
may compromise the private information in those
records. In practice, since it is challenging com-
putationally to train and test |T | different models,
we use an estimated measure based on a sample of
30 notes from T.
3.3 Utility Benchmarks
We compare the utility of synthetic vs. real clini-
cal notes by using them as training data in the fol-
lowing clinical NLP tasks.
3.3.1 Estimating lexical-semantic association
As a measure of the quality of the lexical se-
mantic information contained in clinical notes,
we use them to train word2vec embeddings
(Mikolov et al., 2013) with 300 dimensions and a
5-word window 7. Then, we evaluate these embed-
dings on the medical word similarity and related-
ness benchmarks, UMNSRS-Sim and UMNSRS-
Rel (Pakhomov et al., 2010; Chiu et al., 2016).
These benchmarks comprise 566 and 587 word
pairs, which were manually rated with a similar-
ity and relatedness score, respectively.
To evaluate each set of embeddings, we com-
pute its estimated similarity scores, as the cosine
similarity between the embeddings of the words in
each pair. Since our MedText datasets are domain-
specific and not huge in size, our learned embed-
dings do not include a representation for many of
the words in the UMNSRS benchmarks. There-
fore, to ensure that we do have an embedding for
every word included in the evaluation, we limit our
datasets only to pairs, whose words occur at least
20 times and 30 times in MedText-2 and MedText-
103, respectively. Accordingly, the number of
7We used default word2vec hyperparameters, except for
10 negative samples and 10 iterations.
pairs we use from UMNSRS-Sim/UMNSRS-Rel
is 110/105 in the case of MedText-2 and 317/305
in the case of MedText-103. Finally, each set of
embeddings is evaluated according to the Spear-
man’s correlation between the pair rankings in-
duced by the embeddings’ scores and the one in-
duced by the manual scores.
3.3.2 Natural language inference (NLI)
We also probe the utility of clinical notes for per-
forming natural language inference (NLI) – a sen-
tence level task. The task is to determine whether
a given hypothesis sentence can be inferred from
a given premise sentence. NLI, also known as rec-
ognizing textual entailment (RTE) (Dagan et al.,
2013), is a fundamental popular task in natural lan-
guage understanding.
For our NLI task, we use MedNLI, the
first clinical domain NLI dataset, recently re-
leased by Romanov and Shivade (2018). The
dataset includes sentence pairs with annotated re-
lations that are used to train evaluated models.
Romanov and Shivade (2018) report the perfor-
mance of various neural network based models
that typically benefit from the use of unsuper-
vised pre-trained word embeddings. In our bench-
mark, we report the accuracy of their simple BOW
model (also called sum of words) with input em-
beddings that are pre-trained on MedText clinical
notes and kept fixed during the training with the
MedNLI sentence pairs. The pre-trained embed-
dings used were the same as the ones used for
the lexical-semantic association task. In all of
our experiments, we used the implementation of
Romanov and Shivade (2018) with its default hy-
perparameters .8
3.3.3 Recovering letter case information
Our third task goes beyond word embeddings, us-
ing clinical notes to train a recurrent neural net-
work model end-to-end. More specifically, we
use MedText to train letter casing (capitalization)
models. These models are trained based on par-
allel data comprising the original text and an all-
lowered-case version of the same. Then, they are
evaluated on their ability to recover casing for a
test lower-cased text. The appealing aspect of this
task is that the parallel data can be easily obtained
in various languages and domains.
We note that sequential information is impor-
tant in predicting the correct casing of words. The
8https://github.com/jgc128/mednli
simplest example in English is that the first word
of every sentence usually begins with a capital
letter, but title casing, and ambiguous words in
context (such as the word ‘bid’ that may need to
be mapped to ‘BID’, i.e. ’twice-a-day’, in the
clinical prescription context), are other examples.
Arguably, for this reason, the state-of-the-art for
this task is achieved by sequential character-RNN
models (Susanto et al., 2016). We use their imple-
mentation9 with default hyperparameters for our
evaluation.10 We use the dev and test splits of
MedText to perform the letter case recovery task
and report F1.
4 Experiments
In this section, we describe results obtained when
using various models to perform the clinical notes
generation task. We first generate synthetic clin-
ical notes and evaluate their privacy properties.
Then, assuming these notes were shared with an-
other party we evaluate their utility to that party in
training various clinical NLP models compared to
that of the real notes.
4.1 Compared Methods
To generate the synthetic notes, we used primarily
a standard LSTM language model implementation
by PyTorch. 11
We trained 2-layer LSTM models with 650
hidden-units on the train sets of MedText-2 and
MedText-103, and tuned their hyperparameters
based on validation perplexity.12
To get more perspective on the efficacy of the
LSTM models, we also trained a simple unigram
baseline with Lidstone smoothing:
(4)punigram(wi = u|w1..i−1) =
count(u) + 1
N + |V |
where wi is the word at position i, N is the to-
tal number of words in the train set and |V | is the
9https://github.com/raymondhs/char-rnn-truecase
10We use their ‘small’ model configuration for MedText-2
and ‘large’ model configuration for MedText-103.
11https://github.com/pytorch/examples/
12For MedText-2, we trained for 20 epochs, beginning with
a learning rate of 20 and reducing it by a factor of 4 after ev-
ery epoch for which the validation loss did not go down com-
pared to the previous epoch. For the much larger MedText-
103, we trained for 2 epochs, beginning with a learning rate
of 20 and reducing it by a factor of 1.2 every 1
40
epoch if the
validation loss did not go down by at least 0.1, but never go-
ing below a minimum learning rate of 0.1. In all runs, we
used SGD with gradients clipped to 0.25, back-propagation-
through-time 35 steps, a batch size of 20 and tied input and
output embeddings.
size of the vocabulary. As can clearly be seen, this
is a very naive model that generates words based
on a smoothed unigram distribution, disregarding
the context of the word in the note. Therefore, we
expect that the utility of notes generated with this
model would be low. However, on the other hand,
since it captures much less information about the
train data, we also expect it to have better privacy
properties.
We then used the trained models to gener-
ate synthetic MedText-2-M and MedText-103-M
datasets with identical word counts to the respec-
tive real note train datasets, and whereM denotes
a generative model being used. To that end, we
iteratively sampled a next token from the model’s
predicted conditional probability distribution and
then fed that token as input back to the model. We
used an empty line as an indication of an end-of-
note, hence a collection of clinical notes is rep-
resented by the model as a seamless sequence of
text.
We study the effect that using dropout regu-
larization (Srivastava et al., 2014; Zaremba et al.,
2014) has on privacy and the tradeoffs between
privacy and utility. Dropout, like other regular-
ization methods, is a machine learning technique
commonly applied to neural networks to mini-
mize their prediction error on unseen data by re-
ducing overfitting to the train data. It has also
been shown that avoiding overfitting using regu-
larization is helpful for protecting the privacy of
the train data (Jain et al., 2015; Shokri et al., 2017;
Yeom et al., 2017). Accordingly, we hypothesize
that the higher dropout values used in our models
are, the better the privacy scores would be. Utility,
however, typically has a dropout optimum value
over which it begins to degrade.
4.2 Qualitative Observations
We sought feedback from a clinician on the qual-
ity of the generated synthetic discharge summary
notes. A generated note comprises various rel-
evant sections indicated by plain text headers.
These sections are mostly in the right order with
a typical order being: admission details, medi-
cal history, treatment, medications and finally, dis-
charge details. The text of a section is mostly top-
ically coherent with its header. For instance, the
text generated for a medical history section often
includes sentences mentioning medical problems.
On the other hand, although local linguistic ex-
pressions and phrases typically make sense, con-
tinuity across consecutive sentences makes little
clinical sense and many sentences are unclear due
to incorrect grammar. A simple but obvious error
is change of gender for the same patient (e.g. the
pronoun ‘he’ switches to ‘she’). A different ex-
ample for short range language modeling problem
is generation of incorrect terms like “Hepatitis C
deficiency”. The quality of a generated section is
typically much better when it is backed by a struc-
ture as in a numbered list of medications. Yet, a
notable problem here is that lists frequently have
repeated entries (e.g. same symptom listed more
than once). In conclusion, to a human eye, the syn-
thetic notes are clearly distinct from real ones, yet
from a topical and shallow linguistic perspective
they do carry genuine properties of the original
content. A sample snippet of a synthetic clinical
note is shown in Figure 1.
Admission Date :
〈 deidentified 〉
Discharge Date :
〈 deidentified 〉
Date of Birth :
〈 deidentified 〉 Sex :
F
Service :
SURGERY
Allergies :
Patient recorded as having No Known Allergies to
Drugs
Attending :
〈 deidentified 〉
Chief Complaint :
Dyspnea
Major Surgical or Invasive Procedure :
Mitral Valve Repair
History of Present Illness :
Ms. 〈 deidentified 〉 is a 53 year old female who presents
after a large bleed rhythmically lag to 2 dose but the pa-
tient was brought to the Emergency Department where
he underwent craniotomy with stenting of right foot un-
der the LUL COPD and transferred to the OSH on 〈
deidentified 〉 .
The patient will need a pigtail catheter to keep the sitter
daily .
Figure 1: Sample snippet of a synthetic clinical note
4.3 Results
Table 2 shows the results we get when training
the LSTM language models with varied dropout
values. Starting with perplexity, we see that gen-
erally we achieve notably lower (better) perplexi-
ties on MedText, compared to results with LSTM
on WikiText, which are around 100 for WikiText-
2 and 50 for WikiText-103. 13 We hypothe-
size that this may be due to the highly domain-
specific medical jargon and repeating note tem-
plate characteristics that are presumably more pre-
dictable. We also see that best perplexity re-
sults are achieved with dropout values around 0.3-
0.5 for MedText-2, and 0.0 (i.e. no dropout) for
MedText-103, compared to the 0.5 dropout rate
commonly used in general-domain language mod-
eling (Zaremba et al., 2014; Merity et al., 2017).
These differences reinforce our proposal of Med-
Text as an interesting language modeling bench-
mark for medical texts. As a reference for future
work, we report the perplexity results obtained on
the test set data: 12.88 on MedText-2 (dropout =
0.5), and 8.15 on MedText-103 (dropout = 0.0).
Next, looking at privacy, we see that as pre-
dicted, more aggressive (higher) dropout values
yield better (lower) privacy risk scores. We also
see that privacy scores on the large MedText-103
are generally much better than the ones on the
smaller MedText-2. This observation is intuitive
in the sense that we would expect to generally get
better privacy protection when any single personal
clinical note is mixed with more, rather than fewer,
notes in the train-set of a note-generating model.
For the utility evaluation, we chose three repre-
sentative dropout values, for which we generated
the MedText-M notes and compared them against
the real MedText on the utility benchmarks. Look-
ing at the results, we first see, as expected, that
the performance with MedText-M is consistently
lower than that with MedText, i.e. real notes are
more useful than synthetic ones. However, the
synthetic notes do seem to bear useful informa-
tion. In particular, in the case of the letter case
recovery task, they perform almost as well as the
real ones. We also see as suspected, that privacy
usually comes at some expense of utility.
Finally, looking at the unigram baseline, we see
as expected that perplexity and utility is by far
worse than that achieved by the LSTM models,
while privacy is much better. This is yet further
evidence of the utility vs. privacy trade-off. We
hope that future work could reveal better models
that can get closer to the privacy protection values
exhibited by the unigram model, while achieving
utility, which is closer to that of the real notes.
13https://www.salesforce.com/products/einstein/ai-
research/the-wikitext-dependency-language-modeling-
dataset/
note generation model dropout perplexity privacy similarity relatedness nli case
MedText-2
Baseline: Real notes .459 .381 .713 .910
MedText-2-M
LSTM
0.0 15.8 11.7 .227 .125 .678 .895
0.3 12.5 11.8
0.5 12.5 9.6 .259 .160 .692 .895
0.7 15.4 7.5
0.8 20.3 6.6 .146 .016 .699 .883
unigram N/A 702.4 0.9 .027 -.072 .661 .488
note generation model dropout perplexity privacy similarity relatedness nli case
MedText-103
Baseline: Real notes .608 .489 .724 .921
MedText-103-M
LSTM
0.0 7.8 4.9 .415 .351 .697 .918
0.2 8.4 4.0 .401 .337 .702 .915
0.5 10.2 3.7 .315 .271 .713 .910
unigram N/A 803.5 0.3 .094 .170 .644 .469
Table 2: Experimental results with the real MedText and synthetic MedText-M. ‘dropout’ is the dropout value
used to train different LSTM models on MedText and then generate the respective synthetic MedText-M datasets
(0.0 means no dropout applied); ‘perplexity’ is the perplexity obtained on the real MedText validation set for
each note generation model M ; ‘privacy’ is our privacy measure (S − PDTPM,T for every M , where T is
MedText); ‘similarity’/‘relatedness’ are UMNSRS word similarity/relatedness correlation results obtained using
word embeddings trained on MedText and MedText-M; ‘nli’ is the accuracy obtained on the MedNLI test set using
different MedText pre-trained word embeddings; and ‘case’ is the case restoration F1 measure.
4.4 Analysis
To better understand the factors determining our
proposed privacy scores, we took a closer look
at two note generating models, MedText-2-0 and
MedText-103-0, which are the models trained on
MedText-2 and MedText-103, respectively, with
dropout=0.0. First, we note that in 30 out of 30
and 25 out of 30 of the notes sampled to compute
S − PDTPM,T (c) (Eq. 2) in MedText-2-0 and
MedText-103-0, respectively, we observe that
log pM(T )(w
c
j |w
c
1..j−1) > log pM(T\{c})(w
c
j |w
c
1..j−1)
where
j = argmaxi∈1..|c|
(
|log pM(T )(w
c
i |w
c
1..i−1)
− log pM(T\{c})(w
c
i |w
c
1..i−1)|
)
In other words, in the vast majority of the cases,
the maximum differences in probability predic-
tions are due to the model trained on train-set T ,
which includes note c, estimating a higher condi-
tional probability to a word in c than the one esti-
mated by the model trained on T \ {c}. This can
be expected, sinceM(T ) has seen all the text in c
during training, whileM(T \{c}) may or may not
have seen similar texts.
Furthermore, when looking at the actual text
positions j that determine the privacy scores, we
indeed see that the prediction differences that
contribute to the privacy risk measure, are typ-
ically due to rare words and/or sequences of
words in note c that have no similar counter-
parts in T \ {c}. More specifically, several of
the cases where log pM(T\{c})(w
c
j |w
c
1..j−1) ≪
log pM(T )(w
c
j |w
c
1..j−1) occur when: (1) A partic-
ular rare word wcj , such as cutdown, appears only
in a single clinical note c and never in T \ {c}.
This happens, for example, in p(“cutdown” | “Left
popliteal”);14 (2) The rare word is at position
j − 1 as is Ketamine in p(“gtt” | “On POD # 2
Ketamine,”); and (3) The word wcj is not rare, but
usually does not appear right after the sequence
w1..j−1 as in p(“mouth” | “foaming at”), where in
T \ {c} there is always a determiner or pronoun
before the word mouth, or p(“pain” | “mild left
14POD stands for ‘postoperative day’
should”), where should is a typo of shoulder.
These findings lead us to hypothesize that cases
of PHI, such as full names of patients, inadver-
tently left in de-identified notes, might desirably
increase the privacy risk measure output because
of their rarity. This would be interesting to vali-
date in future work.
For risk mitigation, we hypothesize that us-
ing pre-trained word embeddings including rare
words and even more so, pre-training the lan-
guage model on a larger public out-of-domain re-
source (Howard and Ruder, 2018), may help in re-
ducing some of the above discrepancies between
pM(T\{c}) and pM(T ) and hence improve the over-
all privacy score of the models.
5 Related Work
Recently, Choi et al. (2017) proposed medGAN,
a model for generating synthetic patient records
that are safer to share than the real ones due to
stronger privacy properties. However, unlike our
work, their study is focused on discrete variable
records and does not address the wealth of infor-
mation embedded in natural language notes.
Boag et al. (2016) created a corpus of
synthetically-identified clinical notes with the
purpose of using this resource to train de-
identification models. Unlike our synthetic
notes, their notes only populate the PHI in-
stances with synthetic data (e.g. replacing “[**Pa-
tient Name**] visited [**Hospital**]” with the
randomly sampled names “Mary Smith visited
MGH.”
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed synthetic clinical notes generation as
means to promote open and collaborative medical
NLP research. To have merit, the synthetic notes
need to be useful and at the same time better pre-
serve the privacy of patients. To track progress
on this front, we suggested a privacy measure and
a few utility benchmarks. Our experiments using
neural language models demonstrate the potential
and challenges of this approach, reveal the ex-
pected trade-offs between privacy and utility, and
provide baselines for future work.
Further work is required to extend the range
of clinical NLP tasks that can benefit from the
synthetic notes as well as increase the levels of
privacy provided. McMahan et al. (2018) in-
troduced an LSTM neural language model with
differential privacy guarantees that has just been
publicly released.15 Radford et al. (2018) and
Dai et al. (2019) recently showed impressive im-
provement in language modeling performance us-
ing the novel attention-based Transformer archi-
tecture and larger model scales. These methods
are example candidates for evaluation on our pro-
posed clinical notes generation task. With suffi-
cient progress, we hope that this line of research
would lead to useful large synthetic clinical notes
datasets that would be available more freely to a
wider research community.
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